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tion. It is to be feared, however, that it will not get it. For it appears to be one of those questions which philosophers are reluctant to inquire into—for reasons not unlike those which render pessimism an unacceptable topic. These reasons do not appear to be *rational*; and if this is so, they will provide a further example of a belief whose “truth” is a value imputed to it, for reasons that are not intellectual. And it may be all the more valuable to urge philosophers to face such questions, and to undertake the analysis of such beliefs.

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## SIXTEEN LOGICAL APHORISMS

### I

A TRUE judgment and a false judgment have the same logical structure. This is of itself sufficient to show that an analysis of the forms of knowledge has no ontological significance. The nature of knowledge is the same, whatever may turn out to be the nature of the world. This position is one of armed neutrality, and stands ready to defend itself against both pragmatism and intellectualism.

### II

All errors in epistemology may be reduced to one: the deliberate or unconscious confusion of the instrumentalities of thought with the objects of thought. Propositions which hold true of the former do not apply to the latter, and vice versa. The former are ideal entities (neutrals); the latter are reals. Even when the object of thought is an ideal entity, it is nevertheless a real with respect to the ideality by means of which thought apprehends it.

### III

The subject-predicate relationship is universal—to judgments. All relations obtaining between the objects of thought of whatever kind, must and can be expressed, when known, through the subject-predicate relationship. This and all other noetic relationships constitute a neutral sphere, wholly indifferent in their unprejudiced transparency to the various real (anoetic) relationships which may be reflected through them.

### IV

A thing both is and is not the sum total of its characteristics. A thing is described or known by its characteristics; but no sum or

organic whole of characteristics can constitute a real. The difference is not a difference in quality, it is a difference in the mode of existence.

## V

Whether any change takes place in the real world, and what significance such change may have, if any, is solely a question of fact. But antecedent to the determination of this question of fact there is a logical presupposition, *viz.*, that meanings do not change, and that it is possible for us to utilize unchanging meanings as instrumentalities of thought. Without granting the validity of this presupposition, it is impossible to assert that the above mentioned question of fact can be significantly determined. It follows evidently that the truth of the logical presupposition in question has no bearing upon the actual solution of the ontological problem.

## VI

Is there a remedy for the evil in the world? Does human life point to a significant human destiny? Whatever may be the answer to these and other questions, says Royce, in the *Problem of Christianity*, the answer will necessarily have to be in the form of an interpretation, and will constitute an appeal to a community of interpretation assumed as real; that is to say, it will be in terms of common meanings (universals), whose possession is shared by members of an intellectual community. Whatever be the answer this presupposition holds, and is validly assumed even by the proposal of a false answer. Behold your answer! Amen.—The answer, such as it is, is irrefutable; but anyone who could be satisfied with such an answer to such a question must be inordinately stupid.

## VII

There is a form of pragmatism which is simply intellectualism turned upside down. When you stand a man on his head you may indeed shake out some of the loose change from his pockets, but you do not transform his vices into virtues. All the vices of intellectualism are present in full vigor in its inverted form.

## VIII

A mistaken zeal for continuity, so abstract as to annihilate the discontinuities which are as essentially a part of reality as its continuity, is the bane alike of intellectualism and of pragmatism. Intellectualism assumes that the characteristics of knowledge are the characteristics of reality; pragmatism asserts that the characteristics of reality are the characteristics of knowledge. The one, conse-

quently, abolishes change; the other, with equal consistency, abolishes, in misinterpreting knowledge, the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* which makes the change real and significant.

## IX

There are logical syntheses, and there are actual syntheses. The synthesis of the ideal and the real in consciousness is an actual synthesis, and can not be logically construed. It is given, and unless it is taken as given, it can never be explained. The given can be construed out of itself after it is given, but the giving of it can never be construed. Logical demonstration is not creation.

## X

Knowledge is the apprehension of things as they are for the purpose of changing the things to suit ourselves, or of changing ourselves to suit the things; or else for the purpose of esthetic contemplation. But knowledge is not itself the process of change which it may serve to initiate. "An apprehension of things which changes them in the apprehension, is a misapprehension."<sup>1</sup>

## XI

If knowledge of objects is transformation of objects, both the fact and the nature of such transformation would have to be revealed by something which is not knowledge. This paradox is insoluble except through a repudiation of the presupposition.

## XII

Modern critics of formal logic assert that it ekes out a precarious and not too honest livelihood by exploiting purely verbal distinctions. This category, "a purely verbal distinction," explains all. But nowhere is it explained what it is that constitutes a distinction purely verbal. Thus this category plays as ludicrous and anomalous a part in these logical discussions as the original whirling motion, or the primeval chaos, in Greek cosmological speculation. It was supposed to explain all, but was itself inexplicable.

## XIII

Mr. Schiller has discovered a paradox in connection with the law of contradiction. The law excludes denial; and yet, another logical principle asserts that *omnis determinatio est negatio*. To put it down *in forma*:

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from Kierkegaard, with a slight modification.

Thesis—Affirmation excludes denial (of the same).

Antithesis—Affirmation includes denial (of the opposite). By omitting the words in parenthesis we are confronted with a paradox, and it becomes necessary to resort to a grandiose explanation (which does not explain). Why not allow the words in parenthesis to stand, and thus eliminate the paradox and the grandiose (and irrelevant) explanation?

#### XIV

I have discovered the following paradox in connection with Mr. Schiller's explanation of the laws of thought. Let me put it down *in forma*:

Thesis—Schiller affirms that the laws of thought are as a matter of fact contradicted by experience.

Antithesis—Schiller wills, nevertheless, that the laws of thought shall not allow themselves to be contradicted by experience. My solution of this paradox is simple, and while the solution might possibly be regarded as an affront to Mr. Schiller and a defiance of his logical insight, it could never by any possibility be described as an "affront to experience and defiance of change."

#### XV

Logical laws can not become the object of a free choice. To a free choice there corresponds the existence of real alternatives, and also of a conception of these alternatives. But no conception of significant alternatives is possible except on the basis of the prior validity of logical laws. To will a logical law is simply to acknowledge it, and the refusal to acknowledge it is intellectually suicidal; this is what is meant by calling such a law a logical necessity.

#### XVI

The effort to be bold and daring and brave in logical matters is a work of supererogation. When the sense of risk and adventure is lost from the actual life, it does very little good to introduce a shadowy substitute, dressed out in extravagant rhetorical terminology, into the sphere of logic and metaphysics. When youth is lost, it is little use trying to make oneself young artificially. Let the necessary remain what it is, the necessary; if our thought is not too hopelessly confused, the world will always be seen to have room for the highest daring of the free man.

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